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"UNSPEAKABLE JUSTICE":1 THE OSWALDO MARTINEZ
CASE AND THE FAILURE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO
ADEQUATELY PROVIDE FOR INCOMPETENT DEFENDANTS
INTRODUCTION
On January 3, 2005, a man in James City County, Virginia, was
leaving for work in the early hours of the morning.2 He noticed what
appeared to be a body lying on the side of the road.3 He called the
police, who discovered the body of sixteen-year-old Brittany Binger.
She had been attacked, raped, and strangled to death on January 2.'
Binger's body was found in a position that made it almost appear as
if she had been posed: her arms were stretched out to each side,
making a cross, and her pants were partially pulled down.' The
police concluded that her assailant attacked her "from behind,
covering her mouth with one hand while cutting off her air supply
with the other."6 Her assailant raped Binger and left her for dead,
leaving with some of her possessions.7
The investigation began immediately, and important evidence
was gathered in the first two days. The scene contained valuable
clues: semen found inside Binger's body, DNA under her fingernails,
1. This title was taken from an episode of CNN's "Paula Zahn Now," which detailed the
Oswaldo Martinez case. Paula Zahn Now: Unspeakable Justice (CNN television broadcast
Aug. 24, 2005) (transcript available at 2005 WLNR 13337923) [hereinafter Paula Zahn Now].
2. Commonwealth Attorney Mike McGinty provided most of the details about this case
and investigation. He assisted in this project by providing insights into some of the legal
issues involved.
3. Interview with Mike McGinty, Commonwealth Attorney for Williamsburg and James
City County, in Williamsburg, Va. (Nov. 23,2005). This Note's description of the investigation
is based on the interview with Mr. McGinty unless otherwise noted. For a thorough discussion
of the crime and the investigation, see Paul Duggan, The Unspeakable, WASH. POST, Aug. 2,
2005, at C1.
4. Sue Lindsey, Man Charged with Rape, Murder Deemed Not Ready To Stand Trial,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Sept. 30, 2005, at B4; Paula Zahn Now, supra note 1.
5. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
6. Court Will Judge if Man Can Be Tried; Deaf Mute Illiterate Suspect Charged with
Raping and Killing Teen, RICHMOND TIMEs -DISPATCH, July23, 2005, at B4 [hereinafter Court
Will Judge].
7. Lindsey, supra note 4.
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and a juice bottle left next to her body which contained the same
DNA.' A tracking dog was brought in to follow the killer's scent.
The dog led police first to a nearby convenience store, from which
police obtained a security tape, and then to a local bar, and even to
a specific booth.9 The bartender, when questioned, knew only that
there was a 'Mexican" who often sat there. 10 Police tracked down
the man about whom the bartender was talking and found Oswaldo
Martinez." Police took a picture of Martinez and added his picture
to the growing list of suspects.1 " The original suspect list was
enormous. Police obtained DNA samples from nineteen different
men, none of which matched the DNA taken from the body.13
A few weeks into the investigation, police officers, who initially
had trouble viewing the surveillance tape from the convenience
store because it was encoded, were finally able to view the tape.14
The first thing they noticed was the same man whom they had
found in the bar, Oswaldo Martinez, buying a bottle of juice that
exactly matched the bottle found next to the body. 5 Police then
noticed that the picture of Martinez, which was taken during the
investigation and only two days after the attack, showed a long
scratch on the left side of his face.' 6 Brittany Binger had skin under
her fingernails. 7 Nonuniformed police officers then went back to the
local bar, waited while Martinez drank a beer, and took the empty
bottle when he left. They swabbed DNA from the bottle and sent it
to the lab for testing. 8 A few days later, the results came back. The
8. Keith Rushing, For Now, Deaf.Mute Beats Trial, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.),
Sept. 30, 2005, at Al; Interview with Michael McGinty, supra note 3; Paula Zahn Now, supra
note 1.
9. Paula Zahn Now, supra note 1.
10. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3; Paula Zahn Now, supra note 1.
11. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
12. Id.; Paula Zahn Now, supra note 1.
13. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
14. Id.; Paula Zahn Now, supra note 1.
15. See Duggan, supra note 3; Paula Zahn Now, supra note 1.
16. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3; Paula Zahn Now, supra note 1.
17. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
18. Id. This type of search is constitutional and does not violate the Fourth Amendment
because Martinez, when he was finished with the bottle, no longer had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in its contents. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,40 (1988)
(holding that search of garbage set out on curb was constitutional because owner no longer
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the garbage once it was set out in
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DNA from the beer bottle was the same DNA that had been taken
from Brittany Binger's body. 9
Police then arrested Oswaldo Martinez, a thirty-three-year-old
illegal immigrant from El Salvador.20 This would seem to be an
easy case for the prosecution: "[a]n outrageous crime and an obvious
suspect."21 Martinez was indicted for the robbery, rape, and murder
of Brittany Binger on May 19, 2005.22 The evidence has been
described as "overwhelming" against Martinez.
Oswaldo Martinez is, however, an illiterate deaf-mute with
virtually no communication skills.2" It is likely that he has been deaf
since birth or shortly thereafter.24 He knows very little sign
language and does not even seem to have many "home signs."2"
Police used his brother when trying to interrogate Martinez, and
found that even family members have surprisingly little ability to
communicate with him. Martinez has survived since he arrived from
El Salvador by completing various labor jobs, usually learning what
to do after having a supervisor point to other workers who were
performing similar tasks, and imitating their behavior.2"
Once Martinez had been formally charged, his attorneys quickly
objected to the continuation of the case, based on the defendant's
public where anyone could access it).
19. Rushing, supra note 8; Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
20. Lindsey, supra note 4; Rushing, supra note 8; Interview with Mike McGinty, supra
note 3.
21. Paula Zahn Now, supra note 1.
22. Jury Indicts Man on Murder, Rape Charges, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, May 20,
2005, at B4.
23. Andrew Petkofsky, Capital-murder Suspect Unable To Stand Trial; A Judge Rules
that the Man Charged in James City Teen Girl's Death Is Incompetent, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Sept. 30, 2005, at B7; Paula Zahn Now, supra note 1.
24. See Duggan, supra note 3 (describing Martinez as "[e]nveloped in silence since birth");
Keith Rushing, Lack of Language Skills Will Delay Suspect's Trial; Oswaldo Martinez, Who
Can't Hear or Speak, Is Accused of Raping and Killing a James City Teenager in 2005, DAILY
PRESS (Newport News, Va.), Apr. 6, 2006, at C2 (describing Martinez's limited communication
skills).
25. "Home signs" are signs created specifically for one person. Sometimes home signs are
created if a deaf person wants to communicate something but has not yet learned the sign for
it. See Maurice Belote, Communication Systems To Last a Lifetime: Implications and
Strategies for Adolescents and Young Adults, RESOURCES (Cal. Deaf-Blind Servs.), Summer
2002, at 1, 2. In Martinez's case, because he never formally learned sign language, virtually
all of his communication consists of home signs. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
26. See Duggan, supra note 3.
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inability to communicate with them,27 and argued that he was
not competent to stand trial. A competency hearing was held on
September 29, 2005. The prosecution, although not arguing that
Martinez was competent in his present state, did present a strong
case that he both understands and can communicate more than
it may at first appear.28 For example, the prosecution noted that
while being interrogated, Martinez recognized a picture of Binger,
and subsequently imitated sexual acts using anatomic dolls.29
He also wrote down "$60" in relation to the dolls, thus implying that
he had paid Binger for sex.3° This admission has even been called a
confession on Martinez's part.31 Despite the prosecution's argu-
ments, at the conclusion of the hearing a James City County judge
found Martinez incompetent to stand trial because of his inability
to communicate with his attorneys.2 Under Virginia law, he has to
be reevaluated every six months to determine whether he remains
incompetent.33 In April 2006, Martinez had another competency
hearing and was again found incompetent. 4 His attorney stated
that his client had learned approximately 150 signs, but the clinical
psychologist who is working with Martinez testified that he may
never learn enough to be found competent.3" He was reevaluated,
and again found incompetent, in an October 2006 competency
27. VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-169.1 (2004 & Supp. 2006) (providing that a defendant is
incompetent to stand trial if he "lacks substantial capacity to understand the proceedings
against him or to assist his attorney in his own defense," and not requiring any determination
as to the defendant's mental state or mental health in order to declare him incompetent).
28. See Petkofsky, supra note 23.
29. Inverview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
30. Petkofsky, supra note 23; Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
31. See Paula Zahn Now, supra note 1. Whether Martinez could legally confess to the
murder through gestures is an interesting issue but one that is beyond the scope of this Note.
See generally ERNEST TIDYMAN, DUMMY 182-83 (1974) (reciting the story of a similar
"confession" from deaf-mute suspect Donald Lang and noting the differing views on how to
interpret the suspect's gestures and drawings).
32. Specifically, the Court found that "the defendant can not assist in his defense."
Commonwealth v. Martinez, No. CR 050 14512-00 slip op. (Va. Cir. Williamsburg & James
City County, Sept. 30, 2005); see also Lindsey, supra note 4; Petkofsky, supra note 23;
Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3 (2004 & Supp. 2006).
34. See Rushing, supra note 8 (mentioning reassessment of competency to be held April
5, 2006); Rushing, supra note 24 (discussing the April hearing at which Martinez was found
not competent).
35. Id.
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hearing. During this hearing, his psychologists reported that
Martinez is making "great progress" but that he remains incompe-
tent to stand trial. 6 Martinez's next competency hearing is sched-
uled for May 2007."7
In the meantime, Martinez has been fitted with a hearing aide,
and he has been sent to Western State Hospital in Staunton,
Virginia, to undergo a rigorous language-immersion program
designed to teach him to communicate-either by spoken word or by
formal sign language.3" Martinez's cooperation in learning to
communicate may have a good deal to do with how much he does in
fact understand about his situation. As a friend of Binger's com-
mented, "who's to say he wants to learn how do to it? Because he
knows-I know he [has] to know up in his head that, once he learns,
he [is] going to die. And that's all there is to it." 39
Understandably, the community is outraged that this suspected
killer might never face a jury.4o At the same time, Martinez finds
himself in an interesting and complicated legal situation; one that,
this Note will argue, the legal system is unprepared to handle.4'
Martinez cannot be held indefinitely, as this Note will discuss more
thoroughly, nor can he be civilly committed because he does not
have a mental illness, as required by the Virginia civil commitment
36. Danielle Zielinski, Deaf and Mute Man Still Deemed Unfit for Murder Trial, DAILY
PRESS (Newport News, Va.), Oct. 12, 2006, at Al.
37. Id.
38. Amanda Kerr, Court Can Hold Martinez Indefinitely, VA. GAZETTE, Oct. 1, 2005, at IA;
Rushing, supra note 8; Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
39. Paula Zahn Now, supra note 1.
40. See, e.g., Tamara Dietrich, Is It Right To Remain Silent?, DAILY PRESS (Newport News,
Va.), Apr. 9, 2006, at B5 ("Maybe if there were less evidence of guilt ... or some light at the end
of the tunnel to sign-language competency, the frustration factor would ease. And maybe if
there weren't this gnawing feeling that Martinez might-just might-be a little savvier than
he lets on.... The killing of a 16-year-old girl should not go unresolved because of a failure to
communicate."); Paula Zahn Now, supra note 1 (quoting Kristen Thurston, Binger's friend,
as saying "[tihere will never be justice for her. And that's horrible.").
41. See Court Will Judge, supra note 6 (noting that the judge has the "difficult job [of]
balancing the community's right to have justice served with Martinez's right to due process");
see also Michele LaVigne & McCay Vernon, An Interpreter Isn't Enough: Deafness, Language,
and Due Process, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 843, 849 ("Deaf people with limited language skills
present a dilemma that is not readily recognized by the legal system. They also present a
dilemma that is not readily resolved by the legal system.").
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statute.42 He thus finds himself in "legal limbo"43 where the charges
against him cannot be resolved.
A defendant like Martinez who is found to be incompetent to
stand trial not because of a mental disorder but because of a
physical inability to communicate has been termed "linguistically
incompetent. 44 While this is not a common disability, it is more
common than one might imagine. 45 Regardless of what happens at
Martinez's May 2007 hearing, therefore, his case is illustrative of
serious gaps in the present judicial system in dealing with linguisti-
cally incompetent defendants, not only in Virginia, but also across
the country. The Martinez case will be used throughout this Note to
illustrate the gaps in the current law, to understand how those gaps
affect defendants, and to examine what needs to be done to fill the
gaps.
Part I of this Note will discuss the case of Donald Lang, a case
that is very similar to Martinez's, in order to examine the difficul-
ties involved in a case with a defendant who cannot communicate.
Part II will analyze Supreme Court decisions in this area and the
ethical and legal implications of requiring Martinez to learn to
communicate for the purpose of having him face the death penalty
for his alleged crime. Part III will analyze the current standards
defendants must meet in order to be found competent to stand trial
and the gaps those standards leave regarding linguistically
incompetent defendants. Part IV will discuss what can be done with
Martinez and with other defendants like him. Finally, this Note will
conclude by discussing the failure of the legal system to account for
42. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
43. Bruce J. Winick, Psychotropic Medication in the Criminal Trial Process: The
Constitutional and Therapeutic Implications ofRiggins v. Nevada, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
637, 680 (1993) (discussing defendants whose competency may be restored through
medication).
44. The term "linguistically incompetent" refers to any finding of incompetency which is
based on language deficiency absent any mental deficiency. The term is used mostly in
literature regarding deaf defendants. It will be used throughout this Note to refer to
defendants who are incompetent to stand trial and whose incompetency is based not on any
mental retardation or mental deficiency, but rather on the inability to communicate with the
outside world. For a discussion of linguistic incompetence and the various cases which have
implicitly recognized its existence, see LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 41, at 903-13. See also
Duggan, supra note 3; Paula Zahn Now, supra note 1.
45. See infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text.
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defendants who cannot communicate and will offer suggestions for
what can be done with future cases like Martinez.
I. THE "DUMMY': 46 THE STORY OF DONALD LANG
Donald Lang's case is remarkably similar to Martinez's story.47
Lang's tale is one of an illiterate deaf-mute linked by circumstantial
evidence to the brutal killing of a prostitute in the late 1960s.48
Lang, like Martinez, knew only a few signs and was virtually unable
to communicate anything other than his immediate physical
needs.49 Like Martinez, he was found incompetent to stand trial and
ordered to a treatment center for the purpose of teaching him how
to communicate. 0
Lang's case provides a helpful illustration of the legal system's
failure to account for defendants like Martinez and Lang, who are
not competent because of their inability to communicate, but who do
not suffer from any type of mental deficiency. Lang's case also
provides insight into what could potentially happen in Martinez's
case, and into the long and difficult legal battle which is likely to
ensue.
51
Lang's case is especially interesting because Lang was actually
tried while incompetent.52 When it became apparent that Lang
would not be able to learn enough to communicate with his attor-
neys at any time in the near future, Lang's attorney, Lowell Myers,
asked the court to take the case to trial, stating that he was waiving
the defendant's right not to be tried while incompetent.3 The court
46. Lang was known as the "dummy" in his neighborhood because of his communication
difficulties. TIDYMAN, supra note 31; see also DONALD PAULL, FITNESS To STAND TRIAL 116
(1993).
47. See PAULL, supra note 46, at 115.
48. See id. at 115-16.
49. Id. at 115.
50. Id. at 116.
51. See id. at 115, in which the author, one of Lang's defense attorneys, comments that
"[Lang's] legal difficulties provide a case which embodies almost every issue surrounding
[competency] which can be imagined."
52. Id. at 117.
53. People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 263 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ill. 1970). Myers made several
other motions at the same time, specifically, a motion that the indictment be dismissed
because of the time elapsed since Lang's arrest and a motion to enter judgment on an
earlier jury verdict regarding Lang's competency to stand trial. Id. These motions were also
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refused to grant this order, leading one commentator to note that
"[the law] was a neat trap, a Catch-22 of jurisprudence.... [E]ven if
the defendant was innocent, he had no right to prove it because he
was incompetent to stand trial.5 4 In the effort to protect his due
process rights, therefore, the state was actually depriving him of his
liberty without ever proving him guilty of any crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In 1970, the Supreme Court of Illinois, after receiving a report
from the mental institution to which Lang was committed that he
was making no progress toward competency,5" held that a defendant
facing indefinite commitment should be given an opportunity to
obtain a trial to determine whether he is guilty or should be
released.56 The court left it up to the trial court to determine the
necessary procedures to ensure that Lang would be given "a
reasonable opportunity to obtain the benefit of his constitutional
rights. 57 The prosecution ended up dismissing the charges,
however, because after five years its case had fallen apart due to
lost evidence and a witness's death. Lang was released" but was
again arrested later that same year for the murder of another
prostitute. Under the holding in People ex rel. Myers, Lang was tried
for this second crime despite his incompetence.59 In January 1972,
Lang was found guilty of murder and sentenced to fourteen to
twenty-five years in prison. ° The court, on appeal, noted that, inlight of Pate v. Robinson,1 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held
denied. Id.
54. TIDYMAN, supra note 31, at 100 (emphasis in original); see also Bruce J. Winick,
Restructuring Competency To Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV. 921, 927 (1985) (noting that
under current law, even if a defendant wishes to be tried while incompetent he cannot because
he is incompetent to make that decision).
55. See Briggs, 263 N.E.2d at 110-12.
56. Id. at 113; see also id. (citing a 1953 British case, Regina v. Roberts, (1953) 2 All E.R.
340, in which the court allowed a full trial of a deaf-mute defendant before determining the
fitness issie because the court feared that trying the issue of fitness first might result in
detaining an innocent).
57. Briggs, 263 N.E.2d at 113.
58. PAULL, supra note 46, at 117; TIDYMAN, supra note 31, at 168.
59. PAULL, supra note 46, at 117.
60. Id.; see also TIDYMAN, supra note 31, at 265.
61. 383 U.S. 375, 377-78 (1966) (holding that court's failure to inquire into defendant's
competency when the issue was raised violated defendant's constitutional rights to a fair
trial).
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that it was a violation of due process to try a defendant while
incompetent, the decision by Lang's attorney, Lowell Myers, to go to
trial could not be binding on Lang, who was not competent to
participate in that decision.62
The catch-22 that is inevitably created in this type of case arose
when the state of Illinois, not wanting to release the defendant
because he was accused of a serious and violent crime, tried to have
him civilly committed.6 3 In order to have Lang held, the state was
required to show that he was dangerous,64 which arguably would
violate his presumption of innocence, because the only evidence of
Lang's dangerousness was the same evidence which had previously
been used against him at trial. 5 The state was also required to
make a showing about Lang's mental health or ability in order to
civilly commit him.66 The exact showing the state was required to
make, however, was constantly changing during the years when
Lang's case worked its way through the courts. The appellate court
in 1975 distinguished the question of fitness to stand trial, based on
a mental or physical condition, from the question of competence,
which "is a mental health term dealing with whether an individual
should be committed to an institution or not. 6 v For this reason, in
two hearings in 1976, Lang was found unfit to stand trial, 68 but not
civilly committable because he did not suffer from a mental
disorder.69 As one commentator has noted, the "situation of someone
who is unfit to stand trial but is not subject to involuntary hospital-
ization [is one that the judge at the civil commitment hearing found]
62. People v. Lang, 325 N.E.2d 305, 309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); PAULL, supra note 46, at 117.
63. See PAULL, supra note 46, at 120.
64. Id.
65. Id. ('CThus, the state had to prove dangerousness to himself or others by [Lang] as a
consequence of mental disorder. The major thrust of the prosecution's proof of Donald Lang's
dangerousness consisted of going through the same evidence that had been introduced at his
criminal trial ..... ). Arguably, the use of an unproven crime to prove dangerousness violates
due process, see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 763-64 (1987) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that pretrial detention based on a finding of dangerousness violates due
process because it allows an untried indictment to serve as evidence of dangerousness);
however, courts have allowed it.
66. See PAULL, supra note 46, at 124.
67. Lang, 325 N.E.2d at 311.
68. See People v. Lang, 391 N.E.2d 350, 352 (Ill. 1979).
69. Id. at 352-53; PAULL, supra note 46, at 124.
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'perplexing' and reflecting 'serious gaps in the present Illinois
law."'7
In the years that followed, some of those gaps were filled. In 1979,
the Supreme Court of Illinois collapsed the legal definitions of
unfitness and mental illness somewhat, for determinations of civil
commitment, but retained the dangerousness requirement. Citing
a report of the Governor's Commission for Revision of the Mental
Health Code of Illinois, the court stated that, "[t]he necessary
requirement of dangerousness has been retained in the definition of
one who is committable, but under this definition no longer need he
be afflicted with a mental disorder. 71 The court continued,
[h]ereafter, if a person is found unfit to stand trial, he should be
considered mentally ill under the MHDD Code unless his
unfitness is due to a solely physical condition. If that person also
meets the dangerousness requirement of the Code, he should be
considered to be "a person subject to involuntary admission."72
Under this new standard, the state had Lang civilly committed.78
The Supreme Court of Illinois noted also that the pending criminal
70. Id. Recognizing that unfitness does not equal incompetence, the law provides that a
defendant who is unfit without a substantial probability of becoming fit within the year must
be afforded a discharge (innocence only) hearing, released with all charges dropped, or
subjected to a civil commitment hearing. If at that hearing, the defendant is not committed,
he "shall be remanded to the court having jurisdiction of the criminal matter for disposition
pursuant to subparagraph (1) (discharge hearing] or (2) (release] of this Section." 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-23 (West 2006). In 1979, when Lang's case was before the Supreme
Court of Illinois, the law, somewhat similarly, provided that "[i] f the defendant is not ordered
hospitalized in such hearing, the Department of Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities shall petition the trial court to release the defendant on bail or recognizance,
under such conditions as the court finds appropriate, which may include ... requiring ...
treatment for his mental condition." Lang, 391 N.E.2d at 352. But as the Supreme Court of
Illinois was nonetheless unsure what to do with Donald Lang based on that law, see id. at
353-56, neither it nor the current statute can be said to provide sufficient guidance.
71. Lang, 391 N.E.2d at 356.
72. Id.
73. PAULL, supra note 46, at 131. Lang later challenged his confinement on the theory that
the definition of "mentally ill" was unconstitutionally vague under the statute that governed
civil commitment and under the Supreme Court of Illinois's interpretation. The court rejected
his argument, reasoning, in part, that the statute clearly applied only to "those mentally ill
who pose a danger to the public or themselves." People v. Lang, 498 N.E.2d 1105, 1127 (III.
1986). For the civil commitment statute Lang challenged, see 91% ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1-
119 (West Supp. 1979) (current version at 405 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-119 (West 2006)).
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charges did not have to be dismissed, whether or not Lang was ever
found competent, because Lang had been found guilty by a jury, and
while that conviction had been overturned, the state had offered
enough evidence to show that he should not be released as an
innocent man.74 For that reason, "the due process issue inherent in
holding pending charges indefinitely over one who will not have a
chance to prove his innocence is not present in this case."75 Donald
Lang has now been confined for forty years without ever having
been validly convicted by a jury of the charges against him.76
Lang's case is a fascinating example of the dilemma posed by a
defendant who is not competent to stand trial but who does not
suffer from a mental disorder. The loophole that fails to account
for defendants like Lang also currently exists in Virginia,77 which
could eventually allow Martinez to go free and to have, in essence,
immunity from prosecution.
Although Lang's conviction was overturned because of the
Supreme Court's holding that it violates a defendant's due process
rights to be tried while incompetent, the Supreme Court has never,
as discussed below, defined exactly how much a defendant needs to
be able to assist in his own defense before he can be found compe-
tent. This question leaves open an argument that even defendants
like Lang and Martinez may, in particular cases, be able to provide
sufficient assistance.78 Such an argument was not explored in the
Lang case but might have allowed for a resolution of it-as it may
yet in the Martinez case.
74. PAULL, supra note 46, at 131.
75. Lang, 391 N.E.2d at 358; PAULL, supra note 46, at 127.
76. Duggan, supra note 3. Had Donald Lang served the maximum sentence he was given
after his 1972 trial, he would have been imprisoned for twenty-five years. See supra note 60
and accompanying text. He has therefore already served more time than he faced in prison
when first awaiting trial.
77. Virginia law requires that in order to civilly commit a person, the state must make a
showing that the person has a mental illness. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-816 to -817 (2005).
Martinez does not have a mental illness. One psychiatrist who examined him suggested that
he might be slightly mentally disabled, Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3, although
it is unclear to what extent this supposed mental disability is actually due to Martinez's
inability to communicate his thoughts. The state has noted, however, that any mild
retardation he may have would not be enough to civilly commit him. Id.
78. See supra Part IV.C.
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II. THE LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY FORCED TREATMENT
OF A DEFENDANT
This Part will discuss the legal and ethical issues created by the
mandatory treatment of a defendant like Martinez, and will argue
that, for both ethical and legal reasons, the state will not be able to
treat Martinez indefinitely,79 thus leading to the conclusion that
some other solution will have to be reached in order to resolve his
case. First, pursuant to both state law and the Supreme Court's
decision in Jackson v. Indiana,"° Martinez cannot be held indefi-
nitely if it becomes apparent that he cannot be restored. Second,
there has been a realization that forced medication solely for
the purpose of making a defendant competent to stand trial might
raise ethical as well as due process concerns, and forced language
learning can raise the same issues. Although the permissibility of
forced language learning has never been addressed by the Supreme
Court, the Court did decide, in Sell v. United States,"' the standard
for determining when a state may forcibly medicate a defendant
for trial. Third, the treating psychiatrists who work closely with
Martinez, or with any defendant in his situation, are faced with
serious ethical dilemmas when they are asked to testify as to his
competency, knowing that he is facing the death penalty. Finally,
pursuant to Ford v. Wainwright2 and the laws of Virginia, it is
unlikely that Martinez will actually receive the death penalty if
convicted; accordingly, the state should remove the possibility of the
79. The rest of this Note will be premised on the idea that Martinez will not be able to
learn to communicate, even through sign language, well enough to be found competent to
stand trial. This assumption is partly due to a belief that his psychiatrists will be unwilling
to find him competent, see infra Part II.B.2, and partly due to the extreme difficulty Martinez
will have in acquiring language at the age of thirty-three. Research suggests that "[tihe prime
years for language acquisition-spoken or sign-are over around age five. Even highly
intelligent and motivated deaf people will have a difficult time becoming fluent in [American
Sign Language] as adults at age twenty-five." LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 41, at 861.
Furthermore, even if Martinez reaches an adequate level of sign language, there are still
innumerable problems associated with translating for a deaf client in the courtroom. For more
on this topic, see generally id. In addition, even if Martinez is able to learn enough to assist
in his trial, it is reasonable to think a case like this could arise again, a possibility illustrating
the need for a change in the law.
80. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
81. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
82. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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death penalty in order to ease the ethical dilemma that has been
placed on Martinez's treating psychiatrists.
A. The Legal Issue
Jackson v. Indiana was a similar case to that of Martinez in that
the defendant was a deaf-mute with little communication skill.83 He
was also thought to be mentally retarded and probably unable to
ever learn the communication skills required to become competent
to stand trial.' Jackson was charged with two separate robberies in
which the total amount taken was nine dollars.8 5 Because of his lack
of communication skills and his mental deficiencies, Jackson was
found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the Depart-
ment of Mental Health until he could be deemed "sane."' 6 He could,
therefore, under the trial court's ruling, be held virtually indefi-
nitely, with no requirement that the state periodically review his
progress to ensure that he was in fact becoming competent.8 7 The
Supreme Court overturned this ruling, holding that an incompetent
defendant "cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability
that he will attain [competency] in the foreseeable future."8 If the
court finds that it is not likely the defendant will attain competency
in the foreseeable future, the state must hold him under civil
commitment, or release him."
83. See 406 U.S. at 717.
84. Id. at 718-19.
85. See id. at 717.
86. Id. at 719. Demonstrating the classic struggle within the legal system to understand
the difference between competency and sanity, the trial court remanded the case until such
time as the defendant was found "sane" even though he had never been found insane. It is
also notable that Jackson was condemned to the Department of Mental Health until he could
face charges despite a psychiatrist's testimony that "Indiana had no facilities that could help
someone as badly off as Jackson to learn minimal communication skills." Id.
87. See id. at 719, 727. Jackson's attorney appealed this ruling, noting that it amounted
to a life sentence for his client, but the appeal was denied by the Supreme Court of Indiana.
Id. at 719.
88. Id. at 738.
89. Id.; see also Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil
Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 9-33
(1993) (detailing the state-by-state legislative response to Jackson and concluding that
twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have responded inappropriately by
circumventing or ignoring Jackson's rule).
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Under Virginia law, Martinez can, in theory, be held indefinitely
because he is charged with capital murder.9" He can be held
indefinitely provided that the following four conditions are met:
first, he must be reevaluated every six months to determine his
competency; second, he must continue to be found incompetent;
third, the court must find "continued treatment to be medically
appropriate"; and fourth, he must present "a danger to himself or
others."'" The best evidence the state could present to make a
showing that Martinez is a danger to others is the same evidence
that it would have used if he had gone to trial for the murder of
Brittany Binger.92 Other than that evidence, however, there is no
additional evidence that Martinez is a danger. He has never been in
trouble with the law before for any violent behavior, and he has
been a model student while in the care of Central State Hospital
and Western State Hospital.93 Martinez's best chance to be released
is to attack the "medically appropriate" prong of the statute. If, after
being treated for a length of time, Martinez is not making sufficient
progress so that it is likely that he will ever face a trial, his
attorneys may argue that continued treatment is no longer medi-
cally appropriate. 94 They may argue that the state has had the
opportunity to restore Martinez to competency, and that, failing to
do so, the state has no choice but to release him or to civilly commit
him, pursuant to Jackson. If this happens, Martinez effectively will
have immunity from both the alleged murder of Binger as well as
90. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(E) (2004 & Supp. 2006); see also Morris & Meloy,
supra note 89, at 18 (concluding that statutes tying the permissible length of treatment to the
crime charged violate Jackson and due process because the goal of holding an incompetent
defendant is to restore competence, and "[a] defendant charged with a serious crime is not by
that fact more difficult to treat or less responsive to treatment than a defendant charged with
a less serious crime"); Duggan, supra note 3 (noting that Martinez has been charged with
capital murder).
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(E) (2004 & Supp. 2006).
92. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
93. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3. Martinez's only prior run-in with the law
occurred in 2004 when he was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. He pled
guilty with the assistance of his brother and paid a fine, but was excused from mandatory
alcohol counseling classes when it became apparent to those involved that he could not
understand the class. Id.; see also Duggan, supra note 3.
94. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738 (holding that "continued commitment must be justified
by progress toward [the] goal" of restoring the defendant to competency). If Martinez is not
making progress, the state cannot continue to hold him.
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any future crimes he might commit, assuming his communication
skills remain unchanged. 5
If an offender cannot be restored to competency, the only way the
state can continue to detain him is through a civil commitment
proceeding. In Martinez's case, however, this is not possible. Civil
commitment under Virginia law requires that the state prove by
clear and convincing evidence that "the person presents an immi-
nent danger to himself or others as a result of mental illness. 97 As
discussed, the state can present evidence of Martinez's dangerous-
ness using the evidence they would present at trial. There has been,
however, no mention of a mental problem on Martinez's part, and
certainly no claim that the murder of Binger was the result of a
mental illness. Because Martinez cannot be civilly committed,98 he
would have to be released if a judge finds that continued education
is no longer "medically appropriate."99
The state likely will not be able to hold Martinez indefinitely
-probably not more than a few years-if he is unable to attain a
sufficient level of communication to be found competent. This is true
of almost any defendant like Martinez, because of the difficulties in
learning language so late in life."° The state will then be forced to
either come up with a new argument that he is in fact competent in
his current condition, or agree to release Martinez.
With some minor variations, the laws of most states, as well as
the federal law,1' mirror those in Virginia regarding both compe-
95. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
96. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738 (noting that defendants who cannot be restored should
either be civilly committed or released).
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-817(B) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
98. See supra note 77. Under Virginia law, Martinez could be civilly committed if the state
could show that he is sufficiently mentally ill "as to be substantially unable to care for
himself." VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-817(B) (West 2005). Because there has been no showing that
he is mentally ill, and no showing that he cannot care for himself-indeed, he was completely
caring for himself before his arrest-he cannot not be committed under this prong of the
statute either.
99. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
100. See supra note 79.
101. In the federal system it is not clear whether Martinez would even qualify as
incompetent. The federal competency statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (West, Westlaw through Dec.
20, 2006), titled the "Determination of Mental Competency to Stand Trial," requires that the
defendant be found to be suffering from a mental disease or defect in order to qualify him as
incompetent to stand trial. In addition, in order to civilly commit a defendant found to be
unrestorably incompetent in the federal system, the court would have to find that the
defendant suffers from a mental disorder or defect. 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2006).
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tency and civil commitment law.10 2 In almost every state, once a
defendant has been found to be incompetent without substantial
probability that he will be restored in a reasonable period, state
statutes require the state to either release the defendant, dismiss
the charges against him, or civilly commit him. 08 The standards for
102. Variations include COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-102(5)(a) (2006) (allowing commitment
of defendants who are "gravely disabled," but defining gravely disabled in terms of mental
illness); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-495(c), -498 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Feb. Reg.
Sess.) (allowing commitment for those with "psychiatric disabilities," but defining psychiatric
disabilities in terms of mental illness); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 229.1(9), .6 (West, Westlaw
through 2006 Reg. Sess. & 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (allowing commitment for anyone who is
"mentally impaired" but defining mentally impaired in terms of mental illness and specifically
excluding a finding of incompetency as being proof of mental illness); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. arts. 641; 648(B)(3) (2003 & Supp. 2006) (requiring no separate civil commitment
hearing because a defendant who is unrestorably incompetent is automatically committed;
however, requiring a finding of a mental disorder for any initial incompetency determination);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-20-102(5), -103 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess. of 59th Leg.)
(permitting commitment of persons with developmental disabilities but defining
developmental disabilities in terms of mental retardation); and TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-301
(2001 & Supp. 2006) (allowing "judicial hospitalization" of incompetent defendants but still
requiring a finding of mental illness in order to hospitalize). Because all these variations
define disabilities in terms of mental abilities, a case of linguistic incompetence in these states
would likely have the same result as the Martinez and Lang cases in Virginia and Illinois.
103. Although the language used in each state statute varies, the practical effect of each
of the cited statutes for an unrestorably incompetent defendant would be that he would be
released with pending charges, released and have the charges dismissed, or civilly committed.
ALA. CODE § 22-52-31 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.); ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.110(b)
(West, Westlaw through 2005 legislation); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4517 (West, Westlaw
through legislation effective June 28, 2006); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-2-310 (West, Westlaw
through 2006 1st Extraordinary Sess. 85th Gen. Assem.); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370(e) (West
Supp. 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-114.5(2) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-56d(m)
(West, Westlaw through 2006 Feb. Reg. Sess.); D.C. CODE § 24-531.04(c) (4) (2001); FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.213(b) (West Supp. 2007); GA. CODEANN. § 17-7-130 (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-
406(3) (West, Westlaw through 2005 legislation); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-212(4)-(5) (West,
Westlaw through 2006 2d Reg. Sess. 58th Leg.); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-3-4 (West, Westlaw
through 2006 2d Reg. Sess.); IOWA CODE § 812.9(3) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.
& 1st Extraordinary Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3303(1) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg.
Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.110(2) (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2005); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 648(B)(3) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 101-B(4)(A) (West, Westlaw
through ch. 552, 2006 2d Reg. Sess. 122d Leg.); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-106(a)-(b)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2031 (West 1999); MINN. R. CRIM.
PRO. 20.01(6) (West 2006); MISS. UNIF. CIR. & COUNTY CT. R. 9.06 (2005); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-14-221(3) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess. 59th Leg.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-
1823(3) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. 99th Leg. (2005)); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
178.460(4)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2005 73d Reg. Sess. & 22d Spec. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 135:17-a (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-6(b) (West
2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-1.4 (West, Westlaw through Laws effective May 17, 2006 2d
Reg. Sess.); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.70 (Consol. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1003, -1008
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civil commitment overall require that the defendant suffer from a
mental disorder or mental illness,'°4 thereby creating "legal limbo"'0 5
(2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-08(2) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1175.6(A)(4) (West, Westlaw through
2006 2d Extraordinary Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.370(9) (West, Westlaw through Reg.
Sess. 2005); 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7403(d) (2001) (dismissing charges only); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
40.1-5.3-3(i)(3)(v) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. ch. 441 of the 2005 Jan. Sess.); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-23-430 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-1OA-15
(West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.) (allowing an incompetent defendant to be held for
treatment only as long as his sentence could have been if he had been convicted, at which
point the state must either release him or civilly commit him); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 46B. 102 (Vernon 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-6(5)(c) (West 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 4820 (Supp. 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-6A-2(f) (LexisNexis 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 971.14(6) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Act 491); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-303(g) (i) (West,
Westlaw through 2006 Budget Sess. 2005). But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 404(a) (2001 &
Supp. 2004) (allowing an incompetent defendant to be held until he is capable of standing
trial, making no provision for unrestorably incompetent defendants); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 123, § 15 (West 2003) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-3(1)(2)-(3) (West, Westlaw through
2006 Pub. L. ch. 441 of the 2005 Jan. Sess.).
104. ALA. CODE § 22-52-37(a)(7)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.); ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.30.700 (West, Westlaw through all 2006 Legis.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-520 (West,
Westlaw through 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-207(c) (West, Westlaw
through 2006 1st Extraordinary Sess. of 85th Revision Comm'n); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
5008(h)(1)(B)(iii) (West 1998 & Supp. 2006); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545(b)(2) (2001 & Supp.
2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.13(1)(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-81(a)
(1995 & Supp. 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334-60.2 (West, Westlaw through Apr. 13,2006);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-329(b)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2006 1st Extraordinary Sess. of the
85th Leg.); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-26-7-1 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of the 114th
Gen. Assemb.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2966(a) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess.)
(amended by Personal and Family Protection Act, ch. 210, sec. 16, § 59-2966, 2006 Kan. Sess.
Laws (2006)); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.014 (LexisNexis Supp. 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 34-B, § 3864(6)(A)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of the 122d Leg.); MD. CODE
ANN., CRim. PROC. § 3-106(b)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401
(West 1999 & Supp. 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-
21-61 (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-925(1) (2005);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 433A.200(1) (West 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:34 (2006); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.2 (West 2005 & Supp. 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-11(C)(1) (West
2006); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.70 (Consol. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261(9-b) (2005
& Supp. 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02(12) (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 5-101
(West, Westlaw through 2006 2d Extraordinary Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.070(3)(c)
(West 2006) (addressing the mentally ill); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.235 (West, Westlaw
through 2005 Reg. Sess.) (addressing the mentally retarded); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-8 (West,
Westlaw through Pub. L. ch. 441 of the 2005 Jan. Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-510 (West,
Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-403 (2001) (addressing
involuntary commitment); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-502 (2001) (providing for judicial
hospitalization still requiring a finding that the defendant is mentally ill); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 7612(d)(2) (2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-3(a) (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2006); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 25-10-1 10(a)(i)(C) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Budget Sess.).
105. Winlck, supra note 43, at 680.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:2075
not only for Martinez, but for any defendant who is incompetent to
stand trial but who does not suffer from a mental disorder or mental
illness."°6 There are some states that allow for civil commitment of
a defendant with a "developmental disability," or that define mental
illness in terms of a substantial life impairment. In this minority of
states, a linguistically incompetent defendant might be eligible for
involuntary commitment, depending on the exact wording of the
statute.10 7 In Washington State, for example, the legislature has
made explicit findings regarding the inappropriateness of civil
commitment for a developmentally disabled defendant, and has
made special provisions in the law to deal with this situation. 0 8 The
majority of states, however, have not adequately dealt with this
possibility.
B. The Ethical Issues
1. Ethical Issues Raised by Forced Treatment
The Supreme Court has never decided what can be done with a
defendant like Martinez who is not mentally ill but who cannot
stand trial. It is unclear what kind of treatment a state can force
106. As discussed infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text, these types of cases occur
much more often than one might imagine. In some states, there is no indication of what would
happen to a defendant like Martinez because the state laws make no provisions regarding
permanently incompetent defendants. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 404(a) (2005).
107. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202A.011(9) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (defining "mentally
ill person" in terms of an impaired capacity to function as a result of "physiological,
psychological, or social factors"); MONT. CODEANN. §§ 46-14-221(3)(b)-(c), 53-20-102(5), 53-20-
103, 53-20-112 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess. of 59th Leg.) (providing for civil
commitment of defendants not only with "mental disorders" but also with "developmental
disabilit[ies]"; defining "developmental disability" in terms of life impairment; and affording
those "admitted to ... publicly supported residential institution[s] ... "all the rights [of] a
person subject to involuntary commitment proceedings"); OHIO REV. CODEANN. §§ 5123.01(Q),
.011 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006) (defining developmental disability for purpose of statute
governing institutionalization); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27B-1-18 (West, Westlaw through 2006
Reg. Sess.) (defining developmental disability); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.104
(Vernon Supp. 2006) (allowing civil commitment for defendants charged with serious crimes
who have been found to be violent without a finding of mental illness or mental retardation);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-5-101(9)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 3d Spec. Sess.) (defining
disability in terms of physical disability that results in impairment of life functions); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 55.06(11) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Act 343) (governing "protective
placement" of those with developmental disabilities).
108. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.095 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
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him to undergo or how long the state can mandate such treatment.
One possible analogy to a situation the Court has decided is the
issue of forced medication used to make defendants who are
mentally ill competent to stand trial. The permissibility of forcing
language learning will therefore be compared to the Supreme
Court's holding allowing forced medication to understand the extent
to which this treatment is likely permissible.' s For some of the
same reasons already discussed, a state cannot forever force a
defendant like Martinez to participate in such a program.
Although the argument has been made that forced medication
should never be permitted solely to allow a defendant to be prose-
cuted, 10 the Supreme Court has rejected that view. Recently, in Sell
v. United States,"' the Court set the standard for determining when
a state can forcibly medicate a defendant in order to make him
competent to stand trial. The Court held that medication cannot be
forcibly administered for the sole purpose of restoring the defendant
to competency without the consideration of several important
questions." 2 First, is there an important governmental interest at
stake?"' The Court has already held that the government's interest
in bringing to trial an individual accused of committing a serious
crime is considered an important interest."4 Second, will involun-
tary medication "significantly further those concomitant state
interests"?" 5 For medication, this requirement also means that the
drugs must be unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the
fairness of the trial, a factor that does not have to be considered in
the situation of language learning. Third, forced medication must be
necessary to further state interests."' Finally, the treatment must
be medically necessary, which the Court defined as "in the patient's
109. One important difference between medication and language learning is that side
effects of medication can also impair the defendant's ability to assist or communicate with
counsel and to participate in his own defense. In this case the required treatment will only
assist the defendant to communicate with his counsel.
110. Winick, supra note 43, at 645 (citing a dissenting opinion in a Supreme Court of
Nevada case).
111. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
112. Id. at 186.
113. Id. at 180.
114. See Brandy M. Rapp, Sell v. United States: Involuntary Administration of
Antipsychotic Medication to Criminal Defendants, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 1047, 1057 (2004).
115. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
116. Id.
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best medical interest in light of his medical condition.""' This
factor is usually evaluated in terms of the potential side effects
that the drug may cause, as well as any less intrusive alternatives
to medication." 8 Sell was decided based on the reasoning of two
prior cases. The first, Washington v. Harper,"9 held that a state can
forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to an inmate with a serious
mental illness against his will only if he is a danger to himself or
others, and the treatment is in his medical interest. Riggins v.
Nevada" held that it was a violation of due process to order the
defendant be administered antipsychotic drugs during the course of
trial over his objection, absent the proper findings. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that in order to forcibly medicate, the trial
court must determine that there are no less-intrusive alternatives,
that the medication is medically appropriate, and that it is essential
for the safety of the defendant or others.' 2 '
The Sell case has settled the area of forcible medication of
defendants; however, "[t]he Court did not consider [in Sell] criminal
defendants who fail to regain competence after long periods of
time," '122 nor has the Court ever considered the plight of defendants
who are incompetent but not in need of medication. The same
factors the Court considered, however, can be analogized to
mandatory language learning. If a court were to apply the Sell test
to Martinez, the court would first consider the government interest
in restoring Martinez to competency and putting him on trial,
which is very high because he is charged with very serious crimes.
Furthermore, the Court has already decided that taking a criminal
defendant who is accused of a serious crime to trial is an important
governmental interest.'23 Next, because the ability to communicate
is essential to Martinez being found competent to stand trial, forced
language learning, if successful, is both necessary to further state
interests and likely to significantly further them.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990).
120. 504 U.S. 127, 129 (1992).
121. Id. at 135.
122. Rapp, supra note 114, at 1068.
123. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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The last factor raises a more difficult question: whether learning
a language is in the patient's best medical interest. Martinez has
survived for thirty-three years without communication skills, and
learning to communicate now will certainly be to his detriment.
124
Considering the nature of the crime, the state's interest in prosecut-
ing Martinez is high enough that it could probably outweigh any
concerns about whether language skills are in Martinez's best
medical interest. Nevertheless, given the difficulty in teaching
language to a person of his age, if he is not making progress after a
few years and the psychiatrists have no additional programs that
they can use to educate him, continued treatment probably would
not be considered to be in his best medical interest any longer.
121
124. Arguably, language learning will be a useful tool for Martinez and will enable him to
do exactly what the state proposes it will let him do-assist in his own defense. What is in
Martinez's "medical interest," however, can also be evaluated in terms of what will happen
to him after achieving these skills. In light of the overwhelming physical evidence against
Martinez, it is highly unlikely that Martinez would be acquitted if he were to stand trial,
notwithstanding any defense he may be able to offer. Martinez's brother interpreted
Martinez's actions, during the interrogation by police, to be a defense that he had consensual
sex with the girl and then left her, sleeping. If this is the defense that Martinez will be
offering, it will most likely not be enough to overcome the physical evidence that indicates his
guilt. This Note will therefore discuss the language learning as detrimental to Martinez for
two reasons. The first is that he is facing a death penalty charge. While it is unlikely that he
will face the death penalty, see infra Part II.C, he is certainly facing life in prison without
parole if convicted of murder and rape, so he would be acquiring these language skills at the
price of his freedom. The second is that Martinez has survived for thirty-three years without
the use of formal language-he has managed to sneak into the country, keep himself alive,
perform odd jobs, and even have a semblance of a social life at the local bar. It is not
necessary, therefore, that he learn to communicate in order to survive. See Henry F. Fradella,
Competing Views on the Quagmire of Synthetically Restoring Competency To Be Executed, 41
CRIM. L. BULL. 447 (2005) (arguing that what is in the patient's best medical interest must
necessarily be evaluated in light of the "underlying governmental actions" of impending
death); Douglas Mossman, Is Prosecution "Medically Appropriate"?, 31 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 15, 20 (2005) ("How can it be proper conduct ... for a physician to treat
a patient when 'success' makes the patient eligible for prosecution, a guilty verdict, and
punishmentT').
In the case of mentally ill patients, it seems that the decision whether treatment is
medically appropriate is easier to make, because the alternative to treatment, a life of severe
mental illness, is as bad as or worse than facing trial. See Brian J. Kane, Student Article, The
Charles Singleton Dilemma: Sane Enough To Die?, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 149, 164-65
(2004). In Martinez's case, the considerations are not the same as those for mentally ill
defendants and the decision of what is medically appropriate is harder to make.
125. See Mossman, supra note 124, at 50 (discussing the different uses of the term
"medically appropriate" and concluding that the most common meaning is that the drug or
procedure is the right way to treat a condition without regard to the legal ramifications that
might result from such treatment). Even under this restrictive view, the treatment of
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In the words of one scholar:
Defendants placed in this subcategory of incompetent defen-
dants thought unlikely to regain their competency are thus
caught in an unhappy legal limbo: Although they cannot be
tried, their criminal charges continue to remain unresolved and
will be revived if and when they become competent. This
possibility provides a strong disincentive to their successful
response to treatment. This can be seen as an example of what
therapeutic jurisprudence terminology calls a 'law-related
psychological dysfunction." '126
The degree of cooperation Martinez offers in his treatment likely
depends on how well he in fact understands what is happening to
him. One study noted that "[d]eath row inmates facing execution
upon successful treatment would inevitably be motivated to attempt
to resist and, indeed, to frustrate such treatment. Even organic
treatment like psychotropic drugs may require a degree of patient
compliance to succeed."'27 It is not known for sure how much
Martinez understands. He appears to understand the seriousness
of the charges pending against him,12 and he has been found to
understand the nature of the proceedings against him,'29 and may
Martinez will be medically appropriate only for as long as it appears to be working. If he is
treated for several years without noticeable improvement, it will no longer be medically
appropriate treatment, and thus, can no longer be mandated by the court.
126. Winick, supra note 43, at 680 (footnotes omitted).
127. Bruce J. Winick, Competency To Be Executed: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Perspective, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 317, 333 (1992). Winick cites as support for this statement
events from Florida, which after an apparent misreading of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972), required that all permanently incompetent defendants be adjudicated not guilty by
reason of insanity. Winick, supra, at 334. Defendants subsequently had a greater incentive
to remain incompetent, and the number of defendants who were so adjudged increased
noticeably. Id.
128. At his arraignment, Martinez's brother was present and attempted to explain the
charges to Martinez. The judge noted that Martinez faced the death penalty, and Martinez's
brother pointed to Martinez and made a motion like he was cutting a throat. Martinez began
to cry and made gestures which his brother interpreted to be a plea for mercy, meaning "I
have two small children." Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
129. The court order found that Martinez was incompetent because he would not assist in
his defense, therefore, presumably finding by omission that he does understand the nature
of the proceedings against him. Commonwealth v. Martinez, No. CR 050 14512-00, slip op.
(Va. Cir. Williamsburg & James City County Sept. 30, 2005); Interview with Mike McGinty,
supra note 3.
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therefore be more likely to resist learning the language skills
that will allow him to be found competent. If Martinez refuses to
cooperate and to learn to communicate, interesting issues will be
raised as to whether he can waive the right to assist in his own
defense. 30 The state has no way to force him to learn the way it can
force a defendant in need of medication to take his medicine.
Requiring Martinez to participate in a language learning program
only to then put him on trial to potentially face the death penalty
thus raises interesting ethical issues. How long can the state hold
him before the treatment is no longer considered to be "medically
appropriate"? What redress does the state have if it becomes
apparent that Martinez is refusing to cooperate? These issues have
not been resolved by the Court nor by state legislatures, and will
likely have to be answered by the court in the Martinez case on an
ad hoc basis.
2. The Ethical Dilemma Created for the Treating Physicians
In addition to the ethical implications created in treating
Martinez and defendants like him, there are ethical dilemmas
created for the psychiatrists who work with such defendants. The
treating psychiatrists know that if they are successful, Martinez will
face the death penalty. Psychiatrists, as physicians, take the
Hippocratic Oath, 3' in which they pledge to do a patient no harm.'32
In the case of language learning, the job of the therapist is even
130. See Peter R. Silten & Richard Tullis, Mental Competency in Criminal Proceedings, 28
HASTINGS L.J. 1053, 1071-72 (1977). If a defendant is found to be competent to stand trial, but
refuses to cooperate with his attorney, the courts have treated the refusal as a relinquishment
by the defendant of his right to assist in his own defense. Id. at 1072 ("So long as a defendant
is mentally able to assist in his defense, the criminal proceeding should not be prevented from
going forward because the defendant voluntarily chooses not to do so."); see also Ferry v.
Indiana, 453 N.E.2d 207, 212 (Ind. 1983) (holding that a defendant who refused to assist his
attorney, but who was able to do so, was competent).
131. The Hippocratic Oath reads, in part, "I will prescribe regimen for the good of my
patients according to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone. To please no
one will I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give advice which may cause his death." See Kane,
supra note 124, at 163.
132. E.g., Fradella, supra note 124, at 449. This ethical dilemma is usually discussed in the
cases of prisoners who have become incompetent since they were sentenced to death. See id.
at 447-49. In light of the strong case against Martinez, discussed in the introduction, similar
issues are raised in the current case.
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more difficult than in the case of forced medication because the
interaction between the patient and the therapist in this case
requires much more than the injection of medicine. Learning a
language requires a much higher degree of cooperation on the
patient's part than does the administration of psychotropic medica-
tion. Therapists will be working very closely with Martinez in order
to teach him to communicate; they are, therefore, not likely to want
to send him to face a possible death sentence. Consequently, it
might be difficult to get a therapist to testify that Martinez is
competent to assist in his defense. 3
In the words of the American Psychiatric Association:
Having taken the Hippocratic Oath, all physicians are duty
bound ... to employ their treatment arts for the benefit of their
patients and ... to alleviate the patient's suffering. In the present
situation, however, those ethical norms are in conflict, for
alleviation of present suffering by giving medication will lead, by
restoration of competence, to death. 34
On the other hand, psychiatrists have an interest in teaching
Martinez, who for thirty-three years has been completely unable to
communicate by signing or speaking, and they will likely want him
to succeed.135 For any psychiatrist involved in a mandatory language
learning program there are irreconcilable goals of both restoring
the patient to competency and abiding by the Hippocratic Oath's
admonition to "do no harm" to a patient.
The forcible treatment of Martinez thus raises ethical concerns,
not only for the legal system, but also for the psychiatrists with
whom he works. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Sell v.
United States, Virginia can hold Martinez for language learning
only as long as such treatment remains justified by continued
progress toward competency. 3 6 For this reason, the argument arises
133. Even in the event that the psychiatrists find Martinez to be a difficult or unlikable
student, the Hippocratic Oath would still make it difficult for them to testify knowing that
Martinez will be sent to face the death penalty. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
134. Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass'n & the American Medical Ass'n as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 7, Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (No. 89-5120)
(citations omitted).
135. See Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
136. See 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003).
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that it may in fact be in the best interest of both Martinez and the
state to have Martinez found competent to stand trial on the basis
of only a limited ability to communicate.
C. The Death Penalty Issue
It is not likely that Martinez will in fact receive the death
penalty. For this reason, the possibility of capital punishment
should be withdrawn from the case in order to ease the ethical
dilemma that faces the psychiatrists charged with his restoration.1
37
The reason Martinez will not likely receive the death penalty
even in the event that he is restored to competency and convicted at
trial is that the issue of the death penalty may never reach the jury.
In order to allow the issue to go to the jury, the state must make a
preliminary showing that one of two factors is present. First, it
could show that the defendant's conduct in committing the crime
was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhumane in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the
victim.' 13 Or, the death penalty could reach the jury after a showing
that the defendant poses a serious threat to society, in light of his
criminal convictions. 39 If Martinez is convicted of this crime, his
conviction could be considered as evidence of future danger, but
there is no other evidence of his past dangerousness, so one
conviction might not be sufficient. Furthermore, Martinez has been
a model prisoner while in jail and at Western State Hospital so
far. '4 If Martinez is convicted and the judge does not allow the
death penalty issue to go to the jury, Martinez probably would be
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
In Ford v. Wainwright, the Court held that it was a violation of
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punish-
ment to execute a convicted defendant who had become incompe-
137. See supra Part II.B.2.
138. VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.2 (2004 & Supp. 2006). It does not appear that the state can
show this. Although it seems that the murder of Binger would fit into this category, when
practically applied, the standard is higher than it may at first seem. The state is required to
show that the defendant "did more than was necessary to kill his victim," for instance, torture,
an element that is not present in this case. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (2004 & Supp. 2006).
140. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
2007] 2099
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tent.14' This standard requires defendants to have the mental
capacity to "know the fact of their impending execution and the
reason for it."'42 Although the state court has so far found that
Martinez understands the nature of the proceedings against him, it
would be difficult to know with certainty that he is making the
connection between the attack on Brittany Binger and his execution.
Furthermore, one of the hardest aspects of language learning is
understanding tenses; one psychiatrist has already testified that
Martinez does not have a sign for the word "future," nor did he
"show any ability to understand concepts or link a series of draw-
ings that conveyed a story."'43 It may therefore be difficult to explain
to Martinez in advance of his execution that he is being executed
and the reasons for the execution. Furthermore, the Court recently
held that there are cases in which a defendant may be competent
to stand trial based on a limited understanding, but may not be
competent to be executed.'44 The argument can be made that
Martinez would fit into this category. If Martinez were convicted
and sentenced to death, serious questions could be raised as to
whether he was able to make the connection between his crime and
his sentence. 4 '
The lower courts have been split over whether Ford allows the
state to forcibly medicate a prisoner in order to make him competent
to be executed,'46 and the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue.
In Perry v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on
the issue,147 but later remanded the case without issuing an
141. 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
142. Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
143. Rushing, supra note 8. He did, however, relate one story, about hurting his back in an
accident in El Salvador. Id.
144. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (noting that mentally retarded persons
may be competent to stand trial but may also have diminished personal culpability
warranting lesser sanctions).
145. Admittedly, the Supreme Court, in the Ford decision, seemed concerned mostly with
mental deficiency, not communicative deficiency, that might prohibit a prisoner from
understanding why he was being executed. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10. It seems, however, that
the argument could be made that without knowing for sure how much Martinez understands,
he cannot be executed for his alleged crime.
146. Compare Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003) (allowing forcible
medication to make a prisoner competent to be executed), with Louisiana v. Perry, 610 So. 2d
746 (La. 1992) (forbidding medication for the sole purpose of making an inmate competent to
be executed).
147. 494 U.S. 1015, 1015-16 (1990).
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opinion'48 in light of the recent decision in Washington v. Harper.'49
The American Psychiatric Association and the American Medical
Association recommended to the Supreme Court as amici in the
Perry case that the only constitutionally permissible option, should
the Court find that it was not permissible to medicate the defendant
for execution, was to commute the defendant's sentence to life
imprisonment, thereby allowing him to be provided with necessary
medical treatment without being forced to choose between his life
and proper treatment. 5 ° In the case of language learning, it is not
clear whether a defendant's education would or could continue until
the time of his execution in order to communicate to him the reason
for his punishment.
Because Martinez is unlikely to receive the death penalty, and
even if he does at the trial level, that punishment is likely to be
challenged on appeal, the state should drop this possibility from
the charges pending against Martinez. Doing so will enable the
psychiatrists who work with Martinez to testify as to his compe-
tency without worrying that they are violating the Hippocratic
Oath, allowing Martinez to learn to communicate without paying
the price with his life.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF THE CURRENT COMPETENCY STANDARD
FOR LINGUISTICALLY INCOMPETENT DEFENDANTS
The current competency standard was first articulated in Dusky
v. United States, 5' in which the Supreme Court decided that a
finding that the defendant has some recollection of events is an
insufficient basis for a judge's determination of competency. 152 The
Court held that the "test must be whether he has sufficient present
148. 498 U.S. 38, 38 (1990) (per curiam).
149. 494 U.S. 210 (1989). Harper did not deal specifically with treatment to be executed but
rather with the state's ability to forcibly medicate an inmate in general. See id.
150. Brief for American Psychiatric Ass'n & American Medical Ass'n as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 134, at 9; see also Lindsay A. Horstman, Comment,
Commuting Death Sentences of the Insane: A Solution for a Better, More Compassionate
Society, 36 U.S.F. L. REv. 823,849 (2002) (recommending that in the case of prisoners who are
on death row but, since being sentenced, have been found to be incompetent, their sentences
be commuted to life so that their illness may be treated without raising many of the ethical
dilemmas already discussed).
151. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
152. Id. at 402.
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ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him."'' The Court
did not define what was meant by consulting with a lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding,'54 thereby leaving that
issue open for clarification within later cases involving linguistic
incompetence.
Notably, the Dusky Court did not include any language relating
to mental illness or mental disorders when articulating the
competency standard;15 5 some states have added that requirement
to their definitions of incompetency,'56 and it is not clear whether a
defendant like Martinez could ever qualify as incompetent in those
states, regardless of his ability, or inability, to assist in his own
defense.
The Supreme Court has clarified aspects of its competency
standards in decisions since Dusky. In Pate v. Robinson, the Court
held that the State's refusal to grant a hearing on the issue of the
defendant's competence to stand trial amounted to a violation of due
process 157 and required that a competency hearing be held when
there is a "bona fide doubt" as to the defendant's competency.' 8 The
State in Pate conceded that the conviction of an incompetent
defendant violates due process."19 Later, in Drope v. Missouri,160 the
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 404(a) (2001 & Supp. 2004); D.C. CODE § 24-531.01
(Supp. 2006); IDAHO CODE § 18-210 (LEXIS through 2006 Reg. Sess.); IOWA CODE § 812.3
(West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess. & 1st Extraordinary Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
3301 (LEXIS through 2005 Supp.); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 641 (2003 & Supp. 2006);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-410 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess.).
157. 383 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1966) (finding a violation of the defendant's constitutional right
to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment and applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
158. Id. at 385.
159. Id. at 378. This is the case that was used to overturn Donald Lang's 1972 conviction.
He was tried while incompetent-neither side made the argument that he was able to "assist"
enough through gestures to be found competent to assist in his defense. Furthermore, Lang's
case was complicated by the fact that it was also doubted whether he understood the
proceedings against him and by the fact that the case against him was largely circumstantial.
The court has already found that Martinez understands the proceedings against him. See
supra note 128 and accompanying text.
160. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
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Court clarified that under the Dusky standards defendants cannot
go to trial unless they possess "the capacity to understand the
nature and object of the proceedings against [them], to consult with
counsel, and to assist in preparing [their] defense."16' The Court has
made it clear that facing trial while incompetent amounts to a
violation of the defendant's due process rights."2
The Court, however, has never decided how much assistance or
consultation the defendant needs to be able to offer to his attorneys.
Arguably, communication through gestures sufficient to convey a
basic theory of the case could be enough to satisfy due process.
For example, a federal district court in United States v. Sermon
held that a defendant who had severe memory loss related to the
alleged crime was competent to stand trial despite his limited
ability to assist in his defense. 6 ' The court noted that the amount
of assistance required may vary depending on the facts of each case,
and that the specific inquiry for the court should be whether the
defendant was able to provide his attorneys with his knowledge
of those facts that were in 'legitimate dispute."'" If so, he was
competent to assist in his defense.6 5
At Martinez's competency hearing, the judge clearly found that,
under the two-prong test of Dusky, Martinez was incompetent under
only one of the prongs.' The judge stated, both in court and in the
order, that Martinez was unable to assist his own defense; therefore
presumably finding by his omission that Martinez does in fact
understand the nature of the proceedings against him.6 7
161. Id. at 171.
162. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text; see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S.
348, 354-56 (1996) (holding that requiring a defendant to prove incompetency by clear and
convincing evidence violates due process); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 450-51 (1992)
(holding that a state may require defendants to demonstrate their incompetence by a
preponderance of evidence).
163. 228 F. Supp. 972, 978 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Commonwealth v. Martinez, No. CR 050 14512-00, slip op. (Va. Cir. Williamsburg &
James City County Sept. 30, 2005).
167. Id.; interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3; see also Rushing, supra note 8 (noting
that Judge Powell found Martinez incompetent after "defense and prosecution experts said
he lacked the communication skills to assist in his own defense").
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Can competency in fact be evaluated on a case-by-case basis? 6 '
The Supreme Court has never been faced with a case like Marti-
nez's, and has therefore never decided how much communicative
ability is required to find a defendant competent. Indeed, it is easy
to find cases in which the defendant was not able to assist very
much in his or her own defense and yet was held competent to stand
trial.'69 The standard, in writing, seems to be fairly high, painting
the picture of a defendant who actively participates in his case,
makes weighty decisions about what to do with his case, and grasps
broad constitutional concepts. In real life, however, defendants are
not always so involved. 7 ° Some argue that the standard for
competency is, in reality, minimal. 7 ' For example, in 2005, a nine-
year-old girl in New York City pled guilty to second-degree man-
slaughter in the stabbing death of her best friend. 72 The issue of her
competency, it appears, was never raised.'73 One scholar of the law
of incompetency has noted that "many criminal defendants who are
not mentally ill may lack a meaningful understanding of the nature
of criminal prosecution. Defendants generally are willing to defer to
168. Other issues may be raised by this flexible determination of "competent," such as
issues related to whether a plea bargain would be valid, for example. As it has already been
determined that Martinez is capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings against
him, this discussion will proceed only in the context of actually taking the case to trial. There
are many other complications that would arise in the event the defense wished to plea
bargain. For a discussion of some of these issues, see Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 364
(1996). The Cooper court also discussed some of the problems inherent in proceeding to trial
with a defendant who is less able than most to assist in his defense. Id. at 364. There are,
however, likely many defendants who are found competent, or for whom the issue is never
raised, who cannot possibly live up the Supreme Court's idealistic view of a defendant who
actively participates in his defense and makes weighty decisions about the way his case is
handled.
169. See Winick, supra note 54, at 971.
170. Id. (noting that "[t]he competency doctrine ... is built on an unrealistic model of the
attorney/client relationship"); see also Dietrich, supra note 40 (noting the inconsistency
between the manner in which Martinez is being treated and the way that other defendants,
especially juveniles, are often treated). Dietrich said, "[wie freely ramrod the feeble-minded
into confessions, even when they didn't do it.... We charge teenagers as adults all the time,
even though child development experts tell us that you can't depend on teenage brains for
rational thought." Id.
171. See PAULL, supra note 46, at 132 (noting that one of Donald Lang's treating
psychologists thought, until 1984, that the goal of "fitness" he was working toward required
Lang to be able to testify-a goal much more onerous than the true "understand and assist"
test).
172. Brooklyn: Girl, 9, Pleads Guilty in Fatal Stabbing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2005, at B7.
173. See id.
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their attorneys."'74 At Martinez's competency hearing, one of the
defense experts offered her opinion that Martinez would not be
competent to stand trial until he had the ability to rebut the DNA
evidence which would be offered against him.175 This expansive view
of the competency standard, however, is not supported by the case
law. 176
Based on the Supreme Court decisions, it is clear that Martinez
cannot go to trial until he can "assist in his own defense."177 The
battle, then, will be over how much he is in fact assisting in his own
defense and how much he needs to be able to assist to go to trial.
Because of the issues already discussed, the state cannot hold
Martinez indefinitely. 178 He will eventually have to be tried or be
released, and the state's main argument to allow him to be tried
will be that he is in fact "assisting" his counsel enough to be found
competent.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
"It is estimated that for each defendant found not guilty by
reason of insanity, at least a hundred defendants are determined to
be incompetent to stand trial.'' 179 Although cases like Martinez
may appear to occur once in a lifetime, they are actually far more
174. Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency To Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated
Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571, 589 (1995)
(footnote omitted).
175. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3.
176. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (noting that mentally retarded
defendants are frequently found competent to stand trial); Walton v. Johnson, 407 F.3d 285,
287 n. 1 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that "retarded individuals may be competent to stand trial");
United States v. McDonald, 43 Fed. App'x 330, *332 (10th Cir. 2002) (upholding a finding of
competency despite defendant's "occasional delusional verbalizations"); State v. Heptinstall,
306 S.E.2d 109, 110 (N.C. 1983) (finding defendant with long history of mental illness and
paranoid schizophrenia competent to stand trial); State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 668 (Utah
1997) (noting that the law only requires the defendant to have the ability to consult with his
lawyer, and does not require that he "help or assist"); Winick, supra note 54, at 971 ('Normal'
defendants in our criminal courts frequently suffer from linguistic, educational, and social
problems that severely impair their ability to function competently....").
177. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 173 (1975) (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 552.020(1)
(1969)).
178. See supra Part II.A.
179. PAULL, supra note 46, at vii; see also NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW 37 (1982) (noting that the incompetency plea is successfully invoked far more often than
the insanity plea, at a rate of about 100 to 1).
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common. In addition to the cases of Martinez and Donald Lang,
there are several other cases of deaf-mutes with little or no commu-
nication skills who have found themselves in a legal system which
did not know how to deal with them. 80 The case of "Jesse R.," for
example, is one of a twenty-four-year-old deaf-mute with "language
skills so limited that they rank in the bottom ten to fifteen percent
of the entire deaf population."'' At the age of nineteen, Jesse R.
entered a plea of no contest to second degree assault and was
sentenced to fifteen years in prison."' Jesse's attorney questioned
his competence, but the trial court found that he was competent "so
long as he was provided a good interpreter."'8 3 Under Wisconsin law,
incompetency required a finding that the defendant suffered from
a mental disorder.184 For the court, Jesse's inability to communicate
was therefore an "interesting issue" but ultimately irrelevant to the
question of competency.185 The trial court later held a postconviction
hearing and reversed the conviction, finding that Jesse was unlikely
to ever be found competent.8 8 LaVigne and Vernon also discuss the
case of Maryellen H., who was deaf since birth but whose family
never learned sign language, which resulted in Maryellen being
severely language deprived. Maryellen became involved in the legal
system when the county tried to take her daughter away from her.
The case was eventually dismissed when the court acknowledged
that Maryellen did not understand what she was supposed to do to
get her daughter back. 187
In the case Graham v. Jenne,8 ' the court granted a habeas corpus
petition of a deaf-mute defendant with few communication skills. In
Graham, the court found that because the defendant could not
communicate, he was not competent, but he also could not be civilly
committed because he did not have a mental disorder; therefore, the
180. See, e.g., supra Part II (discussing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)).
181. See LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 41, at 844 (explaining the case of "Jesse R.," whose
real identity the authors have kept confidential).
182. Id. at 845.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 904.
185. Id. at 904-05. There are still several state statutes, as well as the federal law, which
require a finding of mental disability in order to find the defendant incompetent. See supra
note 156.
186. LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 41, at 846.
187. Id. at 846-47.
188. 837 So. 2d 554, 558-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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state's only option was to hold him for one year for treatment, at
which point the state would have to release him if he had not been
restored to competence.189 These are only a few of the numerous
cases of linguistically incompetent defendants who have challenged
the legal system. 90 One scholar has observed, "[j]udges and lawyers
are very likely to encounter language-deficient deaf or hard-of-
hearing individuals because deaf and hard-of-hearing people are
substantially overrepresented in the criminal ... justice system."'9 '
The legal system has failed to account for linguistically incompe-
tent defendants like Donald Lang and Oswaldo Martinez.'92 It has
been established that they cannot be tried without meeting a
threshold of competency, and the standards for determining they
have reached that threshold have been articulated, but it has never
been decided what to do with those who do not meet the standards.
The legal system has failed to provide for defendants who are not
competent and who cannot easily be restored to competency with
medication. In the end, the legal system's effort to vigorously protect
the due process rights of a defendant has actually deprived him of
due process. Donald Lang now will be held indefinitely without ever
receiving a valid trial; he has been deprived of his liberty without
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1978); Shook v. Mississippi, No.
2:93CV118-D-B (N.D. Miss. June 8, 2000) (denying habeas relief to a deaf-mute with
diminished communication skills serving thirty year sentence for aggravated assault); Holmes
v. State, 494 So. 2d 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Smith, 471 So. 2d 954 (La. Ct. App.
1985) (reversing the trial court's determination that a deaf-mute could be convicted for armed
robbery because he did not have a "mental defect" and therefore did not qualify as
incompetent); State v. Burnett, No. Civ.A. 1638, 2005 WL 32797 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2005)
(affirming that a deaf-mute with little communication ability properly was found
incompetent).
191. LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 41, at 867. The authors also note that a study of prison
populations "revealed that hearing loss severe enough to interfere with everyday functioning
is two to five times more prevalent among prison inmates than among the regular population."
Id.
192. Indeed, some have argued that the legal system is flawed in the way that it deals with
the entire deaf population. See LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 41, at 849. They write that
fundamentally flawed assumptions about the interpreting process are depriving
many, and perhaps even most, deaf defendants of critical information both in
and out of court.... When the legal system confronts an individual ... whose
language skills are below average even for the deaf population, its faith that the
interpreter will be able to make the deaf defendant understand is a surefire
recipe for disaster of constitutional proportions.
2007] 2107
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
due process of law193 Martinez may have a similar fate. Something
needs to be done to prevent that outcome.19 4 A defendant's due
process rights to a fair trial, as well as the community's right to be
safe from predators, must both be protected. In the words of one
scholar:
[T]he laws that govern competency, confrontation, due process,
effective assistance of counsel, provision of interpreters, and
other accommodations are overall more than adequate to meet
the needs of practically every deaf defendant. What is lacking
are the flexibility, understanding, and creativity to apply those
laws in a manner that is relevant to deaf individuals who were
unable to acquire sufficient language.1 95
The following Section will make several suggestions for what can be
done in cases with defendants like Martinez who are unable to
assist in their own defense. The section also will offer specific
suggestions for the Martinez case.
A. The Discharge Hearing
The first proposal is to allow the defense to seek a discharge
hearing, which permits the defendant to establish his innocence
without allowing the state to convict him.196 Discharge hearings
are already allowed in several states. 97 If the defense can make a
193. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text; see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.
715, 740 (1972) (noting that charges are normally dismissed against an incompetent
defendant once it becomes apparent he will never be able to stand trial because of the risk of
the "denial of due process inherent in holding pending criminal charges indefinitely over the
head of one who will never have a chance to prove his innocence").
194. An easy solution to this problem would be to change the language of the state statutes
to make it easier to commit a defendant on the basis of not only mental disorders but also
linguistic incompetence as Illinois did following the Lang case. See supra notes 71-72. But
because of serious considerations regarding the lack of proper treatment for these defendants,
it would not be the best option to simply treat linguistically incompetent defendants in the
same way that the legal system treats mentally incompetent defendants. The proposals
offered are therefore aimed more at specific and long-term solutions to the problem, rather
than simply changing the statutes to make them apply to defendants like Martinez.
195. LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 41, at 850.
196. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 740-41, in which the Court seems to cite with approval the
practice of allowing a defendant to have a trial to establish his innocence without permitting
the state to convict.
197. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 404(a) (2001 & Supp. 2004); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
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preliminary showing of innocence, or create reasonable doubt, then
the defendant should be granted a trial, despite his incompetence.
Not granting a trial "might result in the grave injustice of detaining
as a criminal lunatic a man who was in actuality innocent."
198
B. A Guardian ad Litem
Second, a guardian ad litem should be appointed for the defen-
dant. A guardian ad litem is a person appointed to advocate for the
defendant's best interests and to make medical decisions on his
behalf.'99 This appointment will allow his attorneys to focus on only
his legal issues, ensure that his attorneys do not have a conflict of
interest, and provide the defendant with an advocate who can
represent what is in his medical interest, apart from his legal
quandary. °° Some have advocated creating a federal law whereby
a guardian ad litem would be appointed for mentally incompetent
criminal defendants when the prosecution seeks to medicate the
defendant against his will.20' There is already a similar rule in the
civil arena, which allows for the appointment of guardians in civil
cases for incompetents.2 2 There is not yet a corresponding criminal
5/104-23(a) (1992 & Supp. 2006); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 3-106(d) (LexisNexis Supp.
2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 17(b) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-14-221(4) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess. of the 59th Leg.); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
31-9-1.5 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of the 47th Leg.) (for the most serious crimes);
S.C. CODEANN. § 44-23-440 (2005); W. VA. CODE § 27-6A-6 (LexisNexis 2004); WiS. STAT. ANN.
§ 971.14(1)(c) (West 2006).
198. TIDYMAN, supra note 31, at 137 (quoting the English case of Regina v. Roberts [1953]
2 Q.B. 329).
199. A guardian ad litem is a substitute decision maker, appointed when a person is unable
to make decisions for him or herself. Winick, supra note 54, at 979. See id. at 977-79 for a
thorough discussion of the role of a guardian ad litem for an incompetent defendant in a
criminal case.
200. See Sarah Wolf, The Mentally Incompetent Criminal Defendant: United States v.
Weston and the Need for a Guardian ad Litem, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1071 (2002)
(discussing the case of Russell Weston, whose attorneys objected to his being forcibly
medicated in order to stand trial). As a result of the legal battle which ensued, Weston sat in
a prison for years without receiving much-needed medication, and became extremely sick. Id.
at 1072. This article provides an excellent discussion of the ethical dilemma posed to Weston's
attorneys, who have to make medical decisions for their client based on what is in his legal
interest, and discusses how appointing a guardian ad litem would eliminate this difficulty.
Id. at 1072-73.
201. Id. at 1094.
202. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
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federal statute which exists to protect mentally ill criminal defen-
dants; however, some federal courts have alluded to the fact that it
would be permissible and within the district court's powers to
appoint a guardian if the court felt it was necessary.2 3
C. A More Flexible Determination of Competency
Finally, the very concept of "competency" should be more flexible,
especially in cases in which the defendant is able to understand the
charges against him but is not able to communicate, in the tradi-
tional sense, with his attorneys. The question, overall is one of
fairness. 2°4 What is required by the Due Process Clause in a case
like this? Should the fact that a case is based almost entirely on
physical and scientific evidence make a difference in determining
competency?2. 5 The state may argue that the "able to assist in his
defense" standard should be evaluated based on the type of case.
Some have argued that one standard of competency for all criminal
proceedings is overinclusive, and that the standard of competency
should vary depending on the phase of the criminal process2. 6 or on
the type of case and the "skills that will be required of the defendant
in that [particular] case."207
203. See United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 961-62 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 499 (4th Cir. 1987).
204. Similarly, the standard for reviewing whether a defendant received adequate
interpretation services during a trial often boils down to two questions: (1) Could the
defendant understand? and (2) was it fair? LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 41, at 890. These
seemingly simple questions, however, are in reality not so simple, because what is "fair" is not
easy to determine. Nor is it clear how much the defendant needs to understand. It is certain
that in no case will Martinez understand every word that is spoken at his trial. Is it enough
that he understands the "substance and meaning" of what each witness reports or what the
charges against him are? Id. at 891.
205. Winick, supra note 174, at 594 ("[I]n some cases, the defense strategy does not require
the defendant's participation or understanding, and in other cases the defendant's
participation does not help significantly.").
206. See generally Jason R. Marshall, Two Standards of Competency Are Better than One:
Why Some Defendants Who Are Not Competent To Stand Trial Should Be Permitted To Plead
Guilty, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1181 (2003-2004).
207. Winick, supra note 54, at 974; see also People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 263 N.E.2d 109,
113 (Ill. 1970) ("[Donald Lang] need only give such aid to intelligent appreciation of the
proceeding as sound discretion may suggest. The fact of blindness or deafness of the accused
may lessen the ability and capacity of the defendant to utilize his constitutional rights, but
this will not prevent his being subject to trial."); Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of
Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 561 (1993)
2110
UNSPEAKABLE JUSTICE
This is not a case that would require Martinez to tell his attor-
neys when he believes that witnesses against him are lying or have
reason to lie. The state's case will consist almost entirely of expert
witnesses who will explain the significance of each piece of physical
evidence.218 In numerous cases, less-than-cooperative or mildly
retarded defendants have been convicted on the basis of strong
physical evidence, and the issue of whether they truly understood
this evidence sufficiently to assist in their defense was never
raised.2"9 Overall, Martinez has been found to understand the
charges against him, and although he cannot assist in his defense
in a traditional sense, he has certainly presented his "theory" of the
case when interviewed by the police, and could, presumably, do the
same with his lawyers.210 The question is, can he assist enough to
get a fair trial? In addition, the prosecution is willing to stipulate to
anything that the defense wishes to offer as what Martinez would
say if he were able to testify, or what he has communicated to his
attorneys as his "theory" of the case.2"
Martinez should be held for a period of not more than a few years,
and attempts should continue to be made to teach him to communi-
cate (because there is a possibility that he could surprise everyone
and learn). The process of teaching him, however, should be aimed
not just at teaching him "language" in the abstract, as he is almost
(suggesting the competency standard must be linked to each defendant's particular situation).
208. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3. The only lay witnesses the state is likely
to present will be Brittany's friends, testifying as to the last time they saw her the night of
her death, and someone from the convenience store who can authenticate the tape. Id.
209. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
210. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3; see Shook v. Mississippi, No. 2:93CV118-
D-B, 2000 WL 877008 at *3 (N.D. Miss. June 8, 2000) (holding that defendant who was deaf
but who could read was presented fair trial with aide of an interpreter who transcribed the
entire trial for him). The court in Shook wrote, "[w]e can appreciate that it was not easy for
counsel to discuss the defense with him, but, clearly it could be done. A trial should not be
postponed indefinitely if any reasonable alternative exists." Id.; see also supra note 163 and
accompanying text (discussing United States v. Sermon, 228 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Mo. 1964),
which noted that defendants only need to be able to communicate their knowledge of the facts
which are in legitimate dispute).
211. Interview with Mike McGinty, supra note 3; see also TIDYMAN, supra note 31, at 260
("[n]o conviction can constitutionally be based on circumstantial evidence when the defendant
is not able to get up and explain that evidence."). In Martinez's case, the case is not being built
on circumstantial evidence, but rather consists almost entirely of physical evidence. See supra
note 208 and accompanying text.
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certainly past the point of being able to learn that, but rather
teaching him to communicate about this specific case.
The psychiatrists who are working with Martinez, or with future
defendants like him, should attempt to communicate through facts
of the case and not abstract ideas of "murder," "rape," and "trial."
The task of learning a language is much more difficult than would
be the task of communicating what happened through the use of
pictures, gestures, and signs. Scholars have observed that, "[i]n an
extreme case [of language deprivation], a person will have the
ability to understand sexual function, food, and whatever else it
takes to get by, but dealing in the abstract will be virtually impossi-
ble." '212 Also, the treatment must be tailored to fit the defendant's
needs; therefore, the doctors should not try to teach "ubiquitous
competency classes" designed to teach a deaf person about the
abstract concepts in the criminal justice system, but rather should
create "a program centered on the slow, laborious process of building
a linguistic foundation. 213
One critic of the incompetency process has advocated abolishing
the entire plea, and instead allowing an incompetent defendant a
continuance, at the end of which, when he is "as fit as we can help
[him] to be," the state must either try him or release him.21 4 If a
criminal trial is to take place, he advocates special rules to "mini-
mize" the handicap that the accused's disabilities impose on him.1 5
The author acknowledges that this approach might result in the
trial of an incompetent, but maintains that this is better for both
society and the accused.216 Because the Supreme Court has already
clearly stated that trying a defendant while incompetent violates
212. LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 41, at 865.
213. Id. at 934.
214. MORRIS, supra note 179, at 43, 46-47.
215. Id. But see John H. Robinson, Madness and the Criminal Law, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
297, 306 (1983) (book review) (noting that Morris makes no effort to articulate what these
special rules would be, nor does he indicate how they will be adequate to prevent the trial
from being a "constitutional farce").
The Illinois Appellate Court that reversed Donald Lang's 1972 conviction did not appear
to think that such a trial would never be constitutional; in fact, it stated that in this case the
decision by his attorney to go to trial was not binding on Lang because the trial court failed
to establish trial procedures which effectively compensated for the defendant's disabilities.
People v. Lang, 325 N.E.2d 305, 309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
216. MORRIS, supra note 179, at 49.
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due process,217 however, the better route is not to advocate such a
trial while the defendant remains incompetent, but rather to urge
that he is "competent" under a more flexible standard.21
In addition, there are steps that can be taken to ensure that deaf
defendants get a fair trial. LaVigne and Vernon recommend the use
of certified interpreters, counsel table interpreters, videotaping the
trial for the purpose of record preservation, allowing for an ongoing
review of communication, and changing courtroom procedure to
allow more time to interpret. 21 '9 The defendant would, of course,
have to be provided with an interpreter for his trial. Ideally, the
interpreter would be the psychiatrist who has been working with
him and who understands the gestures that he makes.22 ° In this
way, the defendant could be adjudged guilty or innocent, the
criminal trial would be resolved, and the due process issues
inherent in holding someone indefinitely without providing him
with a trial 2 1 (or the opportunity to plead guilty) would be elimi-
nated.
CONCLUSION
The case of Commonwealth v. Martinez is full of fascinating legal
and ethical issues. It is easy to forget, however, that stuck in the
middle of it all is a person who cannot communicate, in any
traditional way, his thoughts to the outside world. In order to
resolve the criminal issue without holding Martinez indefinitely,
this Note has urged that Martinez be found competent to stand trial
based on a limited ability to communicate. With enough effort,
Martinez may be able to communicate more than it might at first
217. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). But see MORRIS, supra note 179, at 49
(arguing that the "unconstitutional" holding of Pate was in fact dictum, and that the Court
hinted in Jackson that the trial of an unrestorably incompetent defendant might be
constitutional).
218. Winick, supra note 174, at 595.
219. Lavigne & Vernon, supra note 41, at 914-27.
220. See id. at 879 (encouraging interpreters for deaf clients with minimal language skills
to use pantomime and gestures, including the person's own store of gestures, as well as any
other props which might be useful). This view is also becoming more acceptable to those in the
community who would like to see Martinez tried but understand the reality of his disability.
See Dietrich, supra note 40 ("If it comes to it, use stick-figure drawings. Use hand puppets.
Use Muppets, if you have to.").
221. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 740 (1972).
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appear, and any method that can be used to communicate with him,
should be. In this way, he can be afforded the due process that all
defendants are owed, and the state can resolve the murder of
Brittany Binger.
The legal system has not adequately dealt with linguistically
incompetent defendants like Martinez, who cannot stand trial, but
who do not suffer from a mental disorder. More should be done to
establish uniform standards of treatment, and to establish time
limits addressing how long the state can hold such a defendant
before it becomes apparent that he will never become competent to
stand trial. There are more cases like this that come through the
legal system than one would expect. Perhaps the reason that we do
not hear more about these defendants is because they are swept
under the rug and forgotten about in a legal system that does not
know what to do with them.
Jamie Mickelson*
* Special thanks to Mike McGinty for taking time to discuss this case with me and for his
assistance with my research.
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